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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HIDDEN MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

NOS. 15027
15157
15188

vs.
DEE MILLS, et al,
Defendants and Respondents

BRIEF OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES,
Appellant and Respondent

STATEMENT OF CASE
This case presents unique issues for determination by the
Court for which there is no precedence in this State, and very little
authority from other jurisdictions.
Basically the case involves a title dispute to some 542
acres of land in the Heber Valley in Wasatch County, Utah.

Not only

are there important principles of law present, but there are also
substantial values involved.
The case has been before this Court on a prior occasion.
In that case this Court reversed a decision of the lower court which
held that an option to purchase the land in question was invalid.
The events that occurred between the date of the Judgment of the
lower court and the date of reversal by this Court give rise to this
phase of the litigation.
The first issue is the effect and duration of a Lis Pendens,
a matter never before this Court.

The second issue, should it be

reached by the court, is whether a change of zoning secured by an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

occupying claimant which enhances the value of property is

a Prc:j

element of damage to be awarded an occupying claimant.

I

I

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Dee Mills and Evelyn Mills, his wife, defendants,
appellants, and respondents herein, owned, occupied, and famed
land in question for many years.
On December 28, 1964 Dee and Evelyn Mills

granted~~

to East Heber Development Company, predecessor of the present
tiff.

The option was recorded that day (Ex. 1-P).

pk~

Later a dispt;l

arose between plaintiff and Mills concerning the validity of the
option, and this extensive litigation ensued.
A chronology of dates and events is important.

\

I

December 28, 1964

Option from Mills to plaintiff's predecessor

September 14, 1971

Option from Mills to Mil ton C. Christensen
(Ex. 5-P).

October 15, 1971

Lis Pendens, East Heber Development Company ~·
v. Dee Mills, et al (Ex. 3-P).

October 15, 1971

Warranty Deed from Dee and Evelyn Mills to
Paradise Valley Estates, Inc.

October 15, 1971

Warranty Deed from Dee and Evelyn Mills to
Lake Mills Company, a limited partnership.

December 10, 1971

Amended Lis Pendens, Hidden Meadows Developr4
v. Dee and Evelyn Mills.
I

December 10, 1971

Hidden Meadows Development Company commencei I
suit seeking a Decree of Specific Perfun~
with respect to the 1964 option.

August 10, 1972

Lower court, Judge D. Frank Wilkins presidini
entered Judgment for the defendants Dee Ml··.~
Evelyn Mills, Milton C. Christensen,
..
Paradise Valley Estates, Inc., and LakeM~
Company holding plaintiff's option to ben.
and void.

I
I

l
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August 10, 1972

Notice of Appeal filed by plaintiff.

october 12, 1972

Motion for Supersedeas filed by plaintiff.

November 29, 1972

Order by Judge D. Frank Wilkins granting
supersedeas in the amount of $50,000.00.

(Note:

Plaintiff did not post the $50,000.00 Supersedeas Bond.)

January 3, 1973

Warranty Deeds from Lake Mills, a limited
partnership, and Paradise Valley Estates, a
corporation, convey to International
Environmental Sciences.

July 5, 1973

Decision of Supreme Court reversing lower court's
decision (29 U2d 469, 511 P2d 737).

Subsequent to the reversal by this Court, proceedings
for specific performance and enforcement of that Decree were instituted by plaintiff and a Supplemental Complaint was filed naming
as additional parties those persons who acquired an interest in
the real property subsequent to the original judgment by the lower
court.

The only party now challenged is Carole Lee Davis (now

Christensen) and her limited partnership, International Environmental
Sciences.

Plaintiff has elected to acknowledge the validity of

certain contract sales for small tracts of land sold by International Environmental Sciences or its predecessor during the
pendency of an appeal.

Plaintiff does not, however admit that

defendant had any title to convey.

The sequence of events set forth

above frames a fairly simple question, but one with complex and
extremely important ramifications.
Can a landowner convey a marketable title after a judgment
in his favor during the pendency of an appeal?

A subsidiary issue

applicable to this case is raised by the fact that the adverse
claimant moved the court to fix a supersedeas, but then failed to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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I
post the requisite bond.

The conveyances here involved were sut.l
'I

sequent to those proceedings, but prior to the date on which the ·
Supreme Court reversed.
The answer given by this Court will have an effect on
matters concerning the finality of a judgment of the lower court:
of this State and the presumptions surrounding that judgment. T:.l
answer must reach the matter of the duration and effect of a lis
pendens and the interaction of supersedeas procedures.
In reaching its decision here, the Court must be mindfcl
that its duty is to provide certainty and not confusion in

real I

property titles, and it must seek that solution which will promot
the free alienation of property.
It is the belief of the appellant, International Envirc
mental Sciences, that a reversal of the lower court in this case
will accomplish these desirable and necessary goals.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE TITLE ACQUIRED
BY APPELLANT INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES WAS
SUBJECT TO THE LATER REVERSAL OF THIS COURT AND, THEREFORE, INVALID.
Dee Mills, a landowner, prevailed in the lower court
against the option holder plaintiff.

The lower court in an un-

equivocal judgment ruled that the option was invalid and that the
title of Mills is good and valid.
holder appealed to this Court.

Feeling aggrieved, the option

During the pendency of the appeal,

in order to preserve the status quo, the option holder moved the
Court to fix a supersedeas.

However, when the Court set the amount

of the supersedeas at $50,000.00 the courage of the option holder
wavered.

If the judgment of the lower court were affirmed, defen-

dants could easily have suffered $50,000.00 damage during the pendency of the appeal.
gamble.

No bond was filed.

He took no risk.

Plaintiff elected to

As it has now turned out, all of the risk

was upon the defendants who took title in reliance upon the validity
and finality of the lower court judgment which held that the option
was invalid.
After the reversal additional defendants, including
this appellant, were joined in the lawsuit.

They defended their

title on the ground that the lis pendens did not go beyond the
judgment of the lower court and that the plaintiff could not preserve the status quo without filing a bond.

The lower court
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on the contrary ruled that the lis pendens has life and durabilit;
beyond a lower court judgment and that personal knowledge of an
appeal will subject a person dealing with the title to the effect
of a later decree of reversal by an appellate court (Fdg. 12 _ R.

I

227).

I

Let us assume for the moment that this Court agreescw · u

'·:·j,

the lower court and affirms this decision.

The Court should

some practical examples of future results of such a ruling.
not matter what type of title we use.

010
51

It wi:

It could be fee title, leas'·j

hold, mineral right, mining claim, mortgage or other lien, future
interest or whatever.

For this example let us assume that the into

1

est in real property in this case is a mining claim.

Suit is brod

I

by title breaker, claiming a prior right from an earlier locator.
A lis pendens is filed for record.

The lower court, finding

tl~

title breaker's predecessor in interest had not done assessment
rules in favor of the owner of the claim and quiets title against
the adverse claimant.

The owner then receives a handsome offer fo:]

I

his claim, but the third party will not accept title and pay over I
the money until the pending lis pendens is released.

Landowner ttcj

goes to title breaker and requests a release of lis pendens.

Tit!' I

breaker consults his lawyer, who advises him that his chances of

i

prevailing on appeal are not good, but that merely taking the appe':j

I

will cloud the title and prevent a sale of the mining claim or an;'

I

mining activity.

Title breaker goes back to landowner and adri-:

him that he will not release the lis pendens and is going to take'
timely appeal to the Supreme Court.

Landowner then goes to pros·
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pective purchaser and asks for time.

Purchaser is anxious to begin

development and advises landowner that if a sale cannot be consummated within 90 days it will place its risk capital elsewhere.
The result is that the landowner won against a spurious claim, and
yet he loses because without any risk to himself the title breaker
can effectively tie up the real property in question during the
pendency of an appeal or until all possibility of an appeal has
ceased to exist.
The foregoing example might not seem of much compelling
importance, but another example of critical significance exists in
this State today.

While not a matter of record in this case, it is

a matter of common knowledge that the Ute Indians claim vast acreages
outside the reservation and the claim embraces almost all of Duchesne
County and part of Uintah County.
over those lands is sought.

So far only governmental control

Certainly claim to title will follow.

In other areas of the country various Indian tribes have claimed title
to land where it was thought that the title had been settled for over
two hundred years.

The Indians in these matters are aided and en-

couraged by various groups including certain agencies of the United
States government.

The claims are not fanciful.

One day they will

have to be determined in the state and federal courts.
Assume that the Indians claim title to all or practically
all of Duchesne county, whether suit be filed or whether administrative
, proceedings commence.

Assume further that the Court ruled that the

claim of title was without merit.

It is easy to visualize appellate

Proceedings grinding on endlessly through state and federal courts.
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If the Supreme Court affirms the lower court in this case, then
with that precedent the appeals we describe would be without

ri~

The people of Duchesne County, although prevailing in the lowr
court, would be the losers because no one would dare touch a t l(,. I
until appellate proceedings were concluded.

I

The problem, of course, is how to balance the rights

o'l

litigants under a self executing decree or judgment such as is
1

here involved.

A self executing decree is one determining statu•
I

and requires no further implementation by court process.

As an

example, a decree denying a petition to oust a Board of Director:
is a self executing decree.
an appeal?

Is the Board then free to act

duri~

What are the rights of third parties who deal with t'

I

Board in the interim during the pendency of the appeal?
This has been a troublesome problem for the courts, anc
treatment of the matter has not been uniform.

Some courts have

stated that the doctrine of supersedeas has no application to a
self executing judgment or decree.

\

Merrimack River Sav. Bank v. Clay Center, 219 U.S. 527,
534 (1911); Solorza v. Park Water Co., 80 Cal. App. 2d
37, 183 P. 2d 275 ( 2d Dist. 194 7) ; State ex rel Kaplan 1'
Lamb, 239 Ind. 25, 154 N.E.2d 500 (1958); Willis V.
I
Willis, 165 Ind. 332, 75 N.E. 655 (1905); Archer v. Be. I
of Educ., 251 Iowa 1077, 104 N.W.2d 621 (1960); Quinn
v. Bechly, 243 IO\va 1185, 54 N.W. 2d 492 (1952); Hewitti
v. Hawkeye Gas Co., 212 Iowa 316, 232 N.W. 835 (1930);. 1
First Nat'l Bank v. Dutcher, 128 Iowa 413, 104 N.W. 49:1
(1905); Haaland v. Verendrye Electric Coop., 66 N.W. ~~
902 (N.D. 1954); Sakraida v. Sakraida, 192 Ore. 217, ,
217 P.2d 242 (1950); Nichols v. Ingram, 75 Ore. 439, I;'!
P. 988 (1915); Barnard v. Bd. of Educ., 19 wash. 8,
52 P. 317 (1898)

I

Other courts, sensing the basic unfairness involved, ~I
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exercised what is called the court's "inherent power" to preserve
the status quo pending an appeal.
Blaustein v. Standard Oil Co., 43 Del. 238, 45 A.2d
527 (1945); Palmer v. Harris, 230 Okla. 500, 101 P. 852
(1909); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 160
Va. 11, 168 S.E. 617 (1933); Banach v. Milwaukee, 31 Wis.
2d 320, 143 N.W. 2d 13 (1966).
Although the precise question posed by this appeal has
not been determined by the Utah Supreme Court, nonetheless the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure which have been adopted from the Federal
Rules have codified the inherent power of the court and provided a
very broad method that can be utilized by the court to preserve the
status quo.

All that is required is for the unsuccessful party in

the lower court to act expeditiously and post an appropriate bond.
The Rules obviously apply to self executing judgments and decrees.
It is well that these Rules be reviewed at this point.
Rule 62
Stay Of Proceedings To Enforce A Judgment
(a)
Stay Upon Entry of Judgment. Execution or
other proceedings to enforce a judgment may issue
immediately upon the entry of the judgment, unless
the court in its discretion and on such conditions
for the security of the adverse party as are proper,
otherwise directs.
(b)
Stay on Motion for New Trial or for
Judgment.
In its discretion and on such conditions
for the security of the adverse party as are proper,
the court may stay the execution of, or any proceedings
to enforce, a judgment pending the disposition of a
motion for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment
made pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion for relief
from a judgment or order made pursuant to R~le 60,
.
or of a motion for judgment in accordance w1th a mot1on
for a directed verdict made pursuant to Rule 50, or of
a motion for amendment to the findings or for additional
findings made pursuant to Rule 52(b) ·
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I
(c)
Injunction Pending Appeal.
When an appeal I
is taken from an interlocutory or final judgment granr.
ing, dissolving, or denying an injunction, the court~
its discretion may suspend, modify, restore, or grant.
an injunction during the pendency of the appeal upon I
such conditions as it considers proper for the securit.
of the rights of the adverse party.
I
(d)
Stay Upon Appeal. When an appeal is taken I
the appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may obtain,
stay, unless such a stay is otherwise prohibited by la•)
or these Rules.
The bond may be given at or after the~
of filing the notice of appeal.
The stay is effective·,l
the supersedeas bond is approved by the court.
1
(e)
Stay in Favor of the State, or Agency Thereoi.';
When an appeal is taken by the United States, the Stat,\
of Utah, or an officer or agency of either, or by direc~~
of any department of either, and the operation or enfor1\
ment of the judgment is stayed, no bond, obligation, or
other security shall be required from the appellant.
(f)
Stay in Quo Warranto Proceedings. Where the I
defendant is adjudged guilty of usurping, intruding int·: I
or unlawfully holding public office, civil or military,
within this state, the execution of the judgment shall
not be stayed on an appeal.
(g)
Power of Appellate Court not Limited. The
provisions in this Rule do not limit any power of an )
appellate court or of a judge or justice thereof to sta:l
proceedings during the pendency of an appeal or to suspJ
modify, restore, or grant an injunction, writ of mandatE\
or writ of prohibition during the pendency of an appeal)
or to make any order appropriate to preserve the status
quo or the effectiveness of the judgment subsequently
to be entered.
I
.

1

(h)
Stay of Judgment Upon Multiple Claims. When I
a court has ordered a final judgment on some but notall
of the claims presented in the action under the condlt;ci
stated in Rule 54 (b) , the court may stay enforcement or :
that judgment until the entering of a subsequent judgmer:.;
or judgments and may prescribe such conditions as are
necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the party '
in whose favor the judgment is entered.
r

I

(i)
Excepting to Sureties; Justification; Multiple
Sureties; Deposit in Lieu of Bond. The adverse party roo:
except to the sufficiency of the sureties to the under· )
taking filed pursuant to the provisions of this Rule at
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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any time within ten days after written notice of the
filin~ of s~ch.undertakings; and, unless they or other
suretles, Wlthln ten days after service of the notice
of such exception, justify before a judge of the court
in which the judgment was entered, or the clerk thereof
upon not less.than five d~ys notice to the party excepting
to such suretles of the tlme and place of justification
execution of the judgment is no longer stayed. In all '
cases where the bond required exceeds $2,000 and there
are more than two sureties thereon, they may state in
their affidavits that they are severally worth the amounts
for which they agree to be bound if less than that expressed
in the undertaking, provided the whole amount is equivalent
to that of two sufficient sureties. . In all cases where an
undertaking is required by these Rules a deposit in court
in the amount of such undertaking, or such lesser amount
as the court may order, is equivalent to the filing of
the undertaking.
Rule 73
Procedure For Taking An Appeal

* * * * *
(d)
Supersedeas Bond. Whenever an appellant entitled
thereto desires a stay on appeal, he may present to the
court for its approval a supersedeas bond which shall have
such surety or sureties as the court requires. The bond
shall be conditioned for the satisfaction of the judgment
in full together with costs, interest, and damages for
delay, if for any reason the appeal is dismissed or if
the judgment is affirmed, and to satisfy in full such
modification of the judgment and such costs, interest,
and damages as the appellate court may adjudge and award.
When the judgment is for the recovery of money not otherwise secured, the amount of the bond shall be fixed at
such sum as will cover the whole amount of the judgment
remaining unsatisfied, costs on the appeal, interest,
and damages for delay, unless the court after notice and
hearing and good cause shown fixes a different amount
or orders security other than the bond. When the judgment
determines the disposition of the property in controversy
as in real actions, replevin, and actions to foreclose
mortgages or when such property is in the custody of the
sheriff or when the proceeds of such property or a bond
for its value is in the custody or control of the court,
the amount of the supersedeas bond shall be fixed at such
sum only as will secure the amount recovered for th7 use
and detention of the property, the costs of the actlon,
.
costs on appeal, interest, and damages for delay.
(Em~hasls
supplied)
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It is difficult to see how the lower court reached

i~l

decision in this case when the foregoing Rules are considered.
It is even more difficult to see how the lower court reached ill
decision when it was confronted with the fact that the plaintii' I
had requested that supersedeas be fixed and failed to post

t~

\

requisite bond after the court entered its order fixing the amo•:l
I
of the bond at $50,000.00.
It should also be remembered that tr.''
conveyance here attacked by the plaintiff was not made until afu!
plaintiff failed to post the bond.

I

The lower court was probably influenced by the factfu\
~

the plaintiff had filed for record a lis pendens at the time
initial proceedings were commenced.

d.

The Findings of the lower

(Fdg. 12 - R. 227) appear to indicate that the lower court
the lis pendens had life and durability beyond the entry of

hlllI
t~

original lower court judgment, which held that the option was

'

. I
u:.:,
I

The Findings also seem to indicate that Carole Lee Davis, the pr::·

1

cipal partner in appellant International Environmental Sciences, ·J
knowledge of the pending appeal.

This Finding by the court

.

15

nc:

I

1

grounded in fact, and is not good law.
On the matter of actual knowledge of the pending appeai,,
Carole Lee Christensen testified:

Q.

Were you aware prior to January, say February 1
of 1973, that the property was the subject of
some litigation?

A.

Before when?

Q.

Before February 1 of 1973.

A.

Well, I had read -- when I was interested in buyinc
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the property I had read the court decree, so I
guess, yes.
THE COURT:
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

The court what?
The court decree.
Where did you read it?

THE WITNESS: Well, I was interested --when I was
interested -THE COURT:
THE WITNESS:

Where?

Where did you see it?

I saw it in my home.

THE COURT: You didn't go to the courthouse and check
the courthouse records?
THE WITNESS:

No, I didn't do that, it was brought to me.

Q.

(Mr. Garrett)
Were you aware that there were any
proceedings pending in the Supreme Court?

A.

No, I was not.
transcript)

(Tr. 226-227, Neil 0. Cooley

The testimony of Carole Lee Christensen is uncontradicted
in the Record.

When she purchased the property for her limited

partnership, International Environmental Sciences, she knew of the
decree of the lower court ruling the option invalid because she saw
it.

She was unaware, however, of any appellate proceeding.
The judgment of the lower court on this appeal can only

be justified on the grounds that the lis pendens survives the
original judgment and gives constructive notice to all persons
even during the pendency of appellate proceedings.

The consequences

of this court's adopting such a view have already been explored
earlier in this Brief, but now must be reiterated and considered
with supersedeas procedures.
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By affirming, this court would sanction the basic unfa.l
ness of allowing a losing appellant in a real property case, wit:jI
giving any security, to effectively remove real property from t'.',
market for the entire amount of time consumed by the appeals prcc,\
The landowner who already has a judgment entered in his favor, a I
judgment which is entitled to the protection of a presumption of
1

its correctness, is stymied in his use and development of the k.l
I

Additionally, the appellant would not be required to put up secur.:j
even though the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provide a

i

method for maintaining the status quo in all cases during the

I

pendency of appeal.

Why should a real property case such as this

I

be any different than where a party appeals from a money judgment I
against him?

I

If he wishes to avoid execution, he must post adequ1:,

I

security.
The question thus posed as to whether a lis pendens is
effective beyond the entry of judgment has been answered in the
negative by Utah law.
The early Utah case of Dupee v. Salt Lake Val. Loan &
Trust Co., 20 U. 103, 57 P. 845 states:

. . The object of notice of lis pendens is to
keep the subject of the suit, or res, within the pow~
and control of the court until the judgment or decree
shall be entered, so that courts can give effect to thel:
judgments, and that the public shall have notice of the
pendency of the action.
Lis pendens may be defined to
be the jurisdiction, power, or control which courts
acquire over property involved in a suit pending the
continuance of the action, and until its final judgment
therein. This constructive notice of filing the
complaint as required by the statute is equivalent to
actual notice.
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J

~

This case states in effect that lis pendens is a legal
device to enable the court to keep control of the res until the
entry of judgment or decree.

It does not say that it is a device

to enable the court to keep control until some indefinite future
time after the entry of the decree.
The case goes on to state that lis pendens is the power
a court has over property until its final judgment.
In the jurisprudence of this state the term "final
judgment" has always been defined to be that act of a lower court
from which an appeal could be taken.
Stubbs v. Third Judicial District Court, 150 P2d 783 (Utah)

.I
I

9

I

In re Voorhees' Estate, 12 U2d 361, 366 P2d 977
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Clegg, 135 P. 919 (Utah)
At the moment a judgment or decree is entered rights
between parties are adjudicated, and that adjudication must be
presumed to be correct.

At that moment there is nothing pending

before the court (unless issues were reserved or undetermined by
the court, and that problem is not present here).

There is no

longer any need for the court to retain control of the property
and, therefore, the purpose of lis pendens ceases to exist.
The only remaining question is the effect of appellate
proceedings.

Appellate proceedings in this state do not alter

the finality of a judgment.

Rule 62(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, supra, provides that execution or other proceedings to
enforce a judgment may issue immediately unless the court in its
discretion otherwise directs.

Clearly under Utah law the filing
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of a Notice of Appeal does not stay execution on a judgment.
Hence the filing of a Notice of Lis Pendens should not have
!

effect beyond the entry of judgment in the lower court.
36 A.L.R. 421 and 10 A.L.R. 415.

Compan

The rationale of the cases cit:c'

in those two annotations should be rejected by this court becau:,:
of the failure of those cases to recognize the fundamental

~~~

ness of allowing the losing party in a title case to tie up the
property through the appellate process without posting

I

supersede:~

Our court has adopted a very elaborate system to stay
execution from the time the judgment is entered through appellat:l
I
proceedings. Rule 62 and Rule 73 (d) . Judgments in actions invo:vl
title are clearly provided for in Rule 73 (d).

To affirm in this I

case would be to say that in matters involving real property a l:s
pendens will tie up property until appellate proceedings are con·
eluded.

I

I

The basic unfairness will be perpetuated, and the rules

of procedure ignored.
The decision of this court should set forth the proced,;rl
to be followed in matters involving title.

A lis pendens filed i
I

pursuant to Title 78-40-2 will legally maintain matters in st~~:
quo until the issues raised by the pleadings and the rights of ti.i:
parties are adjudicated.

·I

Once the judgment or decree is enterea,:

the losing party should not be able to stay proceedings until
application is made to the District Court oi the Supreme court.
Certainly this is not a cumbersome procedure.

If the losing part!!

in the lower court desires to maintain the status quo pending
further hearing in the District Court or on appeal, he can ask
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-16-

for a stay before judgment is entered.

Upon giving appropriate

security, the parties to that action can be enjoined from disposing
of the real property until all later proceedings are ended.

If

he chooses not to obtain a stay by posting appropriate security,
he should bear the risk of his gamble.

He should not be allowed

to recover the property from a third party.

At that point if he

gambles and wins he should then have to be satisfied with his
remedy at law for damages.

Notice of the appeal or lack of such

notice, which seemed to impress the lower court, has absolutely no
bearing on this principle.

The decision we suggest gives effect

to both the doctrine of lis pendens and the procedures available
to obtain a stay subsequent to the entry of judgment.
For a comprehensive and scholarly discussion of the
problems involved under this Point, see the article in 49 Notre
Dame Lawyer 844 by Messrs. Robert Kratovil and Raymond J. Werner.
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POINT II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES AN AMOUNT COMMENSURATE WITH THE
INCREASED VALUE ADDED TO THE LAND DURING ITS OCCUPANCY,
In the event that the Court does not reverse and award
title to International Environmental Sciences under the reasoning
of Point I of this Brief the Court will then consider
the matters here involved.
The trial of this action was in two phases.

The court

first heard evidence relating to the purchase of the property by
Carole Lee Davis (now Christensen) .

(It should be explained that

Carole Lee Davis is the principal party in the limited
International Environmental Sciences.

partner~~

I

She married Milton Christen:ej

a short time after she acquired title to this property.

Milton

I

Christensen has been a party to these proceedings since they wen
first instituted.

However, as the record shmvs under Point I, Mrs.

Christensen had no knowledge of the pendency of an appeal in this '
matter and the property was purchased with funds from her separate
estate.

The record is clear on this point and it is not contro-

verted.)

The court ruled at the conclusion of that phase of the

hearing that plaintiff should be awarded title to the land.

~

Ata

subsequent hearing, the court awarded International Environmental
Sciences the sum of $35,000 for value added to the property during
the occupancy of defendants.
If we read the Brief of Plaintiff, Hidden Meadows, correct!
the amount of $35,000 is not disputed.

The claim of plaintiff is
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that a portion of the expenditures was made prior to the decision
of Judge Wilkins and some made subsequent to the reversal by the
Supreme Court; and that in all events the expenditures were made
with knowledge that their title might be defeated and, therefore,
the expenditures were not made in good faith as required by the
statute.

Plaintiff cites Utah cases on the subject in which, under

the facts of those particular cases, it was held that the improvements made by the occupying claimant were not made in good faith.
Day v. Jones, 112 Utah 286, 187 P2d 181
Doyle v. West Temple Terrace Co., 47 Utah 238, 152 P. 1180
Erickson v. Doekes, 120 Utah 653, 237 P2d 1012
Reimann v. Baum, 115 Utah 147, 203 P2d 387
What constitutes "good faith" in a case involving occupying
claimants is not defined by our statute on the subject, nor by this
Court.

It is apparent from reviewing those cases that each case must

stand on its own facts as to whether the occupying claimant was in
good faith when improvements were made.
are sound and understandable.

The .decisions in those cases

As an example, in the Day case and

Erickson case the improvements were made under tax titles at a time
when the claimant had been adequately informed that the record title
holder had no intention of abandoning his title.

The following

litigation easily proved the tax title defective and invalid.
However, the cases cited by plaintiff are distinguishable
from this case.

The improvements in this case were made under a

title granted by the record title owner which had been reinforced
by a judicial determination of the District Court that the option of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the plaintiff was invalid.

The correct legal principle

applic~h;

to this case is set forth in 41 Am. Jur. 2d, Improvements, Section '
18:
In some jurisdictions, protection has been extended .
to one making improvements in good faith, in reliance
upon a judicial order or decree awarding the land to him
so as to allow him to recover compensation for the
'
improvements upon the reversal or setting aside of the
order.
The defendants in this case had a right to rely upon the I
validity and integrity of the judgment of the District Court.

Tosa[

that they were not in good faith in making improvements under that
circumstance is to invite legal anarchy.
The good faith of defendants implicit in the Findings and I
I

Judgment of the court on this point (R. 238-241) is clearly supported

I

I

by the evidence.

We now ask the Court to consider the occupying claimant ,
statute in the light of conditions as they exist today on the
Wasatch front communities.

The increase in the number of people

in the populous areas of the State has created tremendous pressure
on the communi ties involved.

Sandy City, Utah as an example is one

of the fastest growing cities in the United States.
of population growth we see land use changing.

With the dynami~
I

Open areas and agri·

cultural lands become subdivisions, shopping centers, and industriai
parks.

We try to avoid haphazard development.

for that purpose.
growth of any kind.
V a 1 ues.

We pass zoning laws .

Not all growth is desirable, and many peop 1 e reds
·
Zoning laws by their very nature dictate land

· can b e put t o use, and the arnoun:
L an d h as va 1 ue on 1 y l· f lt
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of value is directly dependent upon the type of use to which it can
be put.

Land zoned agricultural has little value.

Change the use to

residential or commercial and, dependent upon demand of course, the
value goes up dramatically.
processes is not easy.
zoning change.

Changing the use of land through zoning

Community planners and city councils resist

For the developer it becomes an expensive and time

consuming process to effect a change of use.

A striking example of

the problems inherent in zoning change is the area where this property
is, the Heber Valley of Wasatch County.

A county formerly pastural

and with a small stable population has suddenly experienced an unprecedented demand for housing.
stopped.

Growth, however, has been virtually

There hasn't been a subdivision approved by the County for

some years.

Any use changes that have been effected result in

dramatic increases in value.
What does the foregoing comment have to do with the law
of occupying claimant?
The record shows that during the pendency of the appeal
defendants were able to secure a change in use for a portion of
the land in question from agricultural to residential.
Tr. 32 Cooley Transcript).

(Exh. 17-P,

Exhibit 17-P is a small aerial photograph

which was marked by the witness Christensen showing 80 acres involved
in what was known as the Barnes Tract, and the Road and Mills lots.
There are approximately 80 acres on the Barnes Tract, and approximately 90 acres on the Mills Tract.

Whether the sale of lots on the

Mills Tract was actually authorized by the County Commission is not
altogether clear from the record.

The testimony of Milton Christensen,
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'i

however, is to the effect that the County Commission actually aur.
'·'

ized the sale of not only the Barnes property but also the nine
lots on the Mills Tract.
The significance of this change in use is the dramatic
increase in values.

Portions of the Barnes property were sold dur.rq

the pendency of appeal for amounts ranging from $1,000 to $1,400F,ri

I

acre (Exhs. 20, 21, 22, 27, 28-D).

I

The evidence shows that the option given plaintiff for tie.
full 542 acres was at a price of $86,200.00 (Fdg. 15, R. 227},

Carole Lee Davis Christensen paid $110,000.00 for the land (Exh. 1!·1
The evidence shows that the sale of only the 80 acres tha:
I

were re-zoned will bring a minimum of $80,000.00.

The other 90
t

acres would bring at least $1,000 per acre.

These amounts would

R

more than pay for the land for the plaintiff, leaving approximate!;

p

370 acres free and clear.

The position of the defendant in this

3

case is that the re-zoning activities conducted by defendants resuite

in an increase in the value of the land.
This issue was properly presented to the lower court and
squarely ruled upon.

The lower court held specifically that the

re-zoning obtained by defendant was not an item of improvement
contemplated by the occupying claimant statute (Concl. Law 4, R.
241).

There are no reasons given by the lower court for its

conclusion.
There is, however, no reason why a change in zoning
should not be considered as a valuable improvement to be recovered
by the occupying claimant.
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s

The statutes read:
57-6-l.
Stay of execution of judgment of possession.
Where an occupant of real estate has color of title
thereto, and in good faith has made valuable improvements
thereon, and is afterwards in a proper action found not
to be the owner, no execution shall issue to put the
plaintiff in possession of the same after the filing of
a complaint as hereinafter provided, until the provisions
of this chapter have been complied with.
57-6-2. Claimant to commence action--Complaint-Trial of issues. Such complaint must set forth the
grounds on which the defendant seeks relief, stating as
accurately as practicable the value of the real estate,
exclusive of the improvements thereon made by the
claimant or his grantors, and the value of such improvements.
The issues joined thereon must be tried as in law
actions, and the value of the real estate and of such
improvements must be separately ascertained on the trial.
There is no limiting language in those two sections of
the statute and no definitions are set forth in the chapter.

The

Reimann case, supra, gives a general definition which supports the
position defendants ask the Court to take in this case.

From page

391:
.••. the occupying claimant's measure of recovery is
the extent to which his improvements enhance the value
of the land, or in other words, the difference between
the reasonable relative values of the land with and without the improvements.
(Citing cases)
The reasonable cost of the improvements, alone, is
not sufficient evidence of value, but such cost may be
considered together with all other evidence of value in
determining the increase in value of the land on account
of the improvements.
(Citing cases)
It seems clear that anything that is done to land that
enhances its value should be considered an improvement under the
statute.
The lower court found that the value of the property was
$221,000.00

(R. 240).

This Finding does not include the re-zoning
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because it was specifically excluded by the court in its Findings
and Conclusions Of Law (R. 241).

Based upon the lower court's fi:.

ing of value, the land is worth approximately $500 per acre.

For

at least the 80 acres in question the land has a value by reason
of sales of at least $1,000 per acre.

There is, therefore,

am~~

of approximately $500 per acre unaccounted for by the court on at
least 80 acres.

This amounts to some $40,000 to which the occupyq

claimant is entitled.
The principle we ask the Court to adopt, namely that
re-zoning of property, if it enhances the value of the property,
is an element to be recovered by the occupying claimant, is clear!·
within the purview of the Reimann case, supra, and comports square::f
with the underlying doctrine of occupying claimant which is to
prevent unjust enrichment.
Text book authority supports the position of defendant. ',
41 Am. Jur. 2d, Improvements, Section 1. Generally
speaking, the word "improvement" includes everything that
permanently enhances the value of premises for general
uses. The term includes, not only buildings and fixtures
of all kinds, but many other things as well. Among the
most common illustrations of such general improvements
are the erection of a building; the replacing of old
buildings with new ones; substantial repairs to a building or repairs necessary to preserve a building; the
making of substantial additions to or changes in existing buildings; the construction of a necessary sidewalk
alongside property; the erection of fences; the prepa~a
tion of land for building sites; the preparation of ~1N
or raw land for agricultural purposes; and the plantlng
of a fruit orchard . . . .
The text cites the cases of Kester v. Bostwick, 153 Fla.
437, 15 So. 2d 201 (platting, grading, paving, and landscaping);
and Kimmel v. Peach, 240 Mich. 697, 216 NW 374 involving surveying,
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staking lots, seeding, and labor.
A case in point is that of Town of Little Compton v.
Round Meadows, Inc., 276 A2d 471 (R. I.).

In this case the town

attempted to enjoin the defendant from allowing parking of camper
trailers on the defendant's land which abutted the Atlantic Ocean
and had been used as a campground.
The town points to the phrase "building or improvement" and then declares that since the parking area set
aside for the trailers contains no "building or improvement," the southeasterly part of the parcel does not come
within the shelter afforded by §45-24-10. In making
this argument, the town cites nonconforming use provisions
of the zoning enabling acts of other states wherein they
specially safeguard the existing use of building, structures
and land.
The town, in making this contention, has misconceived
the import of the term "improvement". It is a relative
term whose meaning must be ascertained from the context
and the subject matter of the instr~ent or writing in
which it is used. Wolff Chemical Co. v. Philadelphia,
217 Pa. 215, 66 A. 344. Little Compton obviously believes
that unless a person has placed some type of structure or
fixture on his land, he may not have the benefit of a
nonconforming use. This is simply not so. As used in
§45-24-10, the term "improvement" describes land which
has been converted from its natural state to a different
state and condition for the use and enjoyment of man.
As we view the statute, such an improvement may consist
of vacant land that has been improyed by some betterment
such as cultivation, clearing, drainage, irrigation,
grading or something which otherwise enhances the value
or usefulness of the land. See, Johnson v. Gresham, 5
Dana 542, (Ky. 1837); State ex rel, County of Ramsey v.
Babcock, 186 Minn. 132, 242 N.W. 474. Even if we were
to adopt the town's split view of the five acres in
controversy, it is clear that the trailers were used on
that portion of the premises which can be described as
an "improvement."
Defendants ask this Court to hold that re-zoning
accomplished by an occupying claimant can be, and was in this case,
an improvement which has enhanced the value of the land.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-25Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION
Carole Lee Davis Christensen purchased this land in gocc
faith, relying upon a judgment of the lower court which held that 1
I

the option of plaintiff was invalid.
A Motion to fix supersedeas was filed by claimant, and

I

the court entered an Order thereon which reads in part:
IT IS NOW THEREFORE HEREBY ORDERED that the
execution of and any proceedings to implement and
enforce the Judgment entered herein on the lOth day of
August, 1972, be stayed pending determination of plaintiff's appeal from such Judgment and the defendants,
and each of them, are hereby enjoined and restrained
from encumbering or transferring the real property
described in the Complaint and which is the subject
of the foregoing action pending such determination
of plaintiff's appeal, provided that the plaintiff
file and have approved by this court a bond in the soo
of $50,000.00. •
(R. 44)
The bond was not posted.

Carole Lee Davis Christensen

purchased the land subsequent to that order.

The initial

defendan~l

were not enjoined and restrained, and obviously had a right to seJ:[
I

that property if they chose, and a third party such as Carole Lee
Davis Christensen would have a right to rely on the judgment of

1

I

the lower court.

If that were not enough, she should certainly be

1

able to rely. on the fact that the court later entered its order
enjoining the sale of the property, but only if plaintiff posted
a bond.
The misconceptions and errors of the lower court in this

1

matter must be reversed.

In the event the Court disagrees with the reasoning of :
appellant under Point I above, then we ask that the Court consider I
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I

L

the fact that through the efforts of appellant a portion of the
property was re-zoned and as a result thereof substantial value
added to the land.

We ask the Court to hold that re-zoning, if

it adds value to land, is a proper element of recovery by an
occupying claimant.

The judgment of the lower court must, there-

fore, be reversed and the matter referred back for the purpose
of increasing the amount awarded to defendant for
Respectfully
HANSO

i~~~ovements.

submitted~

& GARRETT

'
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